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Abstract
Democratic systems are built, with good reason, on majoritarian prin-
ciples, but their legitimacy requires the protection of strongly held mi-
nority preferences. The challenge is to do so while treating every voter
equally and preserving aggregate welfare. One possible solution is storable
votes: granting each voter a budget of votes to cast as desired over multi-
ple decisions. During the 2006 student elections at Columbia University,
we tested a simple version of this idea: voters were asked to rank the
importance of the di⁄erent contests and to choose where to cast a single
extra "bonus vote," had one been available. We used these responses to
construct distributions of intensities and electoral outcomes, both without
and with the bonus vote. Bootstrapping techniques provided estimates of
the probable impact of the bonus vote. The bonus vote performs well:
when minority preferences are particularly intense, the minority wins at
least one of the contests with 15￿ 30 percent probability; and, when the
minority wins, aggregate welfare increases with 85￿ 95 percent probability.
When majority and minority preferences are equally intense, the e⁄ect of
the bonus vote is smaller and more variable but on balance still positive.
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11 Introduction
When voters must choose between two alternatives, majority voting works well,
with a single important drawback: the winning alternative commands the wider
support, but not always the more intense. At least since Madison, Mill, and
Tocqueville, political thinkers have argued that a necessary condition for the
legitimacy of a democratic system is to set limits to the tyranny of the majority
and provide some expression to intense minority preferences.1 With increased
recourse to direct democracy, the goal becomes particularly important because
direct democracy deprives minorities of the protections a⁄orded by the election
of a diverse legislature. Devising systems to protect minorities when binary
choices are at stake is thus considered central to the establishment of referen-
dums as legitimate tools of policy-making.2 The challenge is to do so while
treating every voter equally, and avoiding the inertia and ine¢ ciencies of super-
majorities or veto powers.
A possible answer comes from storable votes, a simple voting mechanism
in which individuals voting over multiple binary proposals are granted, in ad-
dition to their regular votes, one or more bonus votes to cast as desired over
the di⁄erent proposals. Decisions are then taken according to the majority of
votes cast. The bonus votes allow voters to single out the issues that they each
consider most important, and make it possible for the minority to win occa-
sionally. But because every voter is treated equally, the majority loses only if,
on average, its members consider a given issue a low priority, while members
of the minority do not: the majority loses "when it should", from an e¢ ciency
point of view. Although counterexamples can be found, typically the increase in
minority representation comes together with an increase in aggregate expected
welfare, relative to simple majority voting.3
Storable votes resemble cumulative voting, a voting system used in corpora-
tions and in some local jurisdictions in the United States and recommended by
the courts exactly to redress violations of fair voting rights. As with storable
votes, cumulative voting assigns to each voter a budget of votes to spend freely
over multiple choices, but cumulative voting applies to a single election with
multiple representatives, while storable votes apply to multiple decisions, each
between two alternatives. The strategic game induced by the voting scheme
is substantially di⁄erent, and to our knowledge existing analyses of cumulative
voting do not discuss the e¢ ciency properties of the scheme.4
1See for example Guinier, 1994. Dahl,1956 and 1989, provide a critical analysis of the ar-
guments; Issacharo⁄, Karlan and Pildes, 2002 discuss the legal implementation and dilemmas.
2Gerber, 1999, and Matsusaka, 2004.
3Casella, 2005; Casella, Palfrey and Riezman, forthcoming. A similar voting scheme system
is proposed in Hortala-Vallve, 2006. As shown by Jackson and Sonnenschein, 2007, the idea
of linking di⁄erent decisions to elicit the intensity of preferences truthfully can be applied
generally. The mechanism proposed by Jackson and Sonnenschein achieves the ￿rst best
asymptotically, as the number of linked decisions becomes large, but is signi￿cantly more
complex than storable votes.
4Experiences with cumulative voting in local elections are discussed in Bowler et al., 2003,
and Pildes and Donoghue, 1995. Cox, 1990, studies the scheme theoretically, Gerber et al.,
2Storable votes are simple and, because voters are routinely presented several
referendums at the same time, could be implemented as a minor modi￿cation
of existing voting practices. So far, testing has been limited to small groups
in laboratory settings.5 But the tight controls of the laboratory should be
complemented by ￿eld studies where the number of voters is large, and voters￿
preferences are observed, as opposed to being induced. This paper reports on
a test based on ￿eld data collected during an actual election. The goal is to
evaluate the impact of storable votes on the probability of minority victories,
aggregate welfare, and voters￿ex-post inequality.
In the spring of 2006, we attached a short survey to students￿election ballots
in two di⁄erent schools at Columbia University, asking students to rank the im-
portance assigned to all binary contests on the ballot, and to indicate where they
would have cast an additional bonus vote, had one been available. An identi￿er
connected responses and actual voting choices, allowing us to construct distri-
butions of intensities and electoral outcomes, both without and with the bonus
vote. Bootstrapping techniques provide estimates of the bonus vote￿ s probable
impact. As a robustness check, in addition to the use of the bonus vote reported
in the survey, we study three alternative plausible rules for casting the bonus
vote. For each of the four cases, we estimate three measures: (1) the frequency
with which the bonus vote allows the minority to win at least one election in
each set; (2) the di⁄erence in aggregate welfare, comparing the hypothetical
outcome using bonus votes to simple majority voting; and (3) the impact of the
bonus vote on ex post inequality. We ￿nd that the bonus vote works well: when
minority preferences are particularly intense, the minority wins at least one of
the contests with 15￿ 30 percent probability, ex post inequality falls, and yet
when the minority wins aggregate welfare increases with 85￿ 95 percent proba-
bility. When majority and minority preferences are equally intense, the e⁄ect
of the bonus vote is smaller and more variable, but on balance still positive.
Student elections are rarely considered worth of study because they are low-
stake contests, measuring students￿popularity more than the attractiveness of
their electoral platforms, in a population that is hardly representative of a typ-
ical electorate. But our work is not about extrapolating political tendencies
from campus elections, nor, because it focuses on binary contests only and non-
representative samples of students, is it really about the campus elections them-
selves. Our objective is to illustrate the voting mechanism and its comparison
to simple majority voting in realistic large scale elections where the distribution
of preferences is not controlled by the researchers ￿ this is the central require-
ment here. For our purposes, the true determinants of the voters￿preferences
are secondary.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we discuss brie￿ y the theory
behind the idea of granting a bonus vote in large elections; section 3 describes
1998, test it experimentally. Cumulative voting was advocated particularly by Guinier, 1994.
Chwe, 1990, presents an e¢ ciency argument in favor of minority representation that arises
from information revelation in common values environment. His approach is unrelated to
ours, where majority and minority interests are opposed.
5Casella, Palrefy and Riezman, forthcoming.
3the design of the survey and the data; section 4 studies the bonus vote choice;
section 5 describes the bootstrapping exercise and its results, and section 6
concludes. A copy of the questionnaire and some additional data and results
are reported in the Appendix.
2 The Theory
We begin by summarizing brie￿ y the theory of storable votes in large elections.
The results described in this section are drawn from Casella and Gelman (forth-
coming), where the model is phrased in terms of contemporaneous referendums
over several proposals. Here, in line with Columbia student elections, the two
outcomes of each election are labeled as two di⁄erent candidates.
A large number n of voters are asked to vote, contemporaneously, on a
set of K unrelated elections (with K > 1). Each election Ek is between two
candidates, ak and bk, with k = 1;:::;K. Voters are asked to cast one vote in
each election, but in addition are given a single bonus vote that can be spent
on any of the elections. Each election is won by the candidate with most votes,
including bonus votes.
The valuation that voter i attaches to election k is summarized by vik.
By convention, a negative valuation indicates that i favors candidate a, and a
positive valuation that i favors b. The valuation￿ s absolute value, denoted by vik,
is the voter￿ s di⁄erential utility from having his or her preferred candidate win
the election ￿ the intensity of the voter￿ s preferences. Voter i￿ s utility function
is then Ui =
PK
k=1 uik(Ek) where uik(Ek) = vik if ￿ {￿ s favorite candidate wins
Ek, and 0 otherwise.
Individual valuations are drawn independently across individuals from a joint
distribution F(v1;:::;vK). The assumption of a common distribution is in prac-
tice equivalent to assuming that we have no additional knowledge about individ-
ual voters (which, for example, would allow di⁄erent distributions for men and
for women, or, in our speci￿c data, for English and for history majors). In this
section, although not in the empirical analysis, we also assume that individual
preferences are independent across elections, and thus voters￿valuations over
election k are drawn from some distribution Fk(v). Each individual knows his
or her own valuation over each proposal, and the probability distribution Fk(v)
of the others￿valuations. There is no cost of voting.
Simple majority voting is designed to give weight to the extent of support
for a candidate ￿ the mass of voters who in election k prefer a to b. Storable
votes allow voters to express not only the direction of their preferences but also,
through the bonus vote, their intensity. How important accounting for intensity
is depends crucially on the shape of the distributions Fk(v).
Suppose ￿rst that the environment is fully symmetric, and nothing sys-
tematic distinguishes either the elections or the two sides in each election:
Fk(v) = F(v) for all k and F(v) symmetric around 0. Then: (a) in equilib-
rium each voter casts the bonus vote in the election to which the voter attaches
highest intensity; (b) with positive probability, one or more of the elections,
4although not all, are won by a candidate supported by a minority of the elec-
torate; and (c) ex ante expected utility with storable votes is higher than ex
ante expected utility with simple majority voting.6
The results are clean, but the assumption of full symmetry is strong and in
fact minimizes the importance of the voting rule. The welfare gains must vanish
asymptotically as the number of voters becomes very large and the empirical
frequencies of the preference draws approximate more and more precisely the
theoretical distributions. In the limit, in each election the two candidates come
to be supported by an equal mass of voters with equal distribution of intensity,
and thus, from a welfare point of view, become interchangeable.
Allowing for asymmetries is important, but not only are asymmetries di¢ cult
to handle analytically, it is also not clear how best to model them. Suppose
￿rst that all asymmetries came from the extent of support: in each election,
one candidate is more popular than the other, and the di⁄erence in popularity
￿ the di⁄erence in the expected mass of supporters ￿ in general varies across
elections. Conditional on supporting either candidate, however, the distribution
of preferences intensity is equal across the two groups of supporters.7 This is the
environment to which majority voting is ideally suited. Then: (a) In equilibrium
all voters cast their bonus vote in the election expected to be closest. (b)
Storable votes and simple majority yield identical outcomes: the minority never
wins. (c) Both voting rules are ex ante e¢ cient.
Now suppose instead that the source of asymmetry is the intensity of sup-
port. In all elections, the two candidates are equally popular ex ante, but
intensities are not equally distributed. For concreteness, suppose that in each
election k supporters of candidate ak have higher expected intensity.8 Then:
(a) in equilibrium each voter casts the bonus vote in the election with highest
valuation; (b) a minority candidate is expected to win occasionally with posi-
tive probability; (c) ex ante expected utility with storable votes is higher than
expected utility with simple majority if a voter￿ s highest valuation is expected
to be on a candidate of type a; and (d) the di⁄erence in ex ante utility does not
disappear asymptotically. Condition (c) is satis￿ed automatically if, for exam-
ple, the distribution of intensities among ak supporters ￿rst-order stochastically
dominates the distribution of intensities among bk supporters. More generally,
it depends on the shape of the distributions and on the number of elections K.
These results are intriguing, but in realistic situations both extent and in-
6To be precise, in the scenario described in the text the welfare superiority of storable votes
holds only if the value of the bonus vote is not too high. In a slightly more general model,
however, where the probability of supporting either candidate is not 1=2 but is stochastic
and distributed according to some distribution symmetric around 1=2, the result holds for
all values of the bonus vote. The assumption of symmetry across elections (Fk(v) = F(v))
simpli￿es the analysis but can be dropped fairly easily; what really matters is the symmetry
across the two candidates (F(v) symmetric around 0).
7Formally, call Gak(v) the distribution of intensity for supporters of candidate a in election
k, and pk the ex ante probability of favoring candidate a in election k. Then suppose Gak(v) =
Gbk(v) = G(v) for all k, but pk 6= ps for k 6= s.
8Suppose pk = p = 1=2, but Gak = Ga 6= Gbk = Gb for all r. In particular suppose that
Ga has higher mean than Gb: Eva > Evb.
5tensity of support are likely to di⁄er across candidates and across elections. It is
di¢ cult to say anything general in such cases because equilibrium strategies will
depend on the exact shape of the distributions of valuations. The limitations
of a purely theoretical analysis are the motivation for this study: What shapes
do the distributions of valuations take in practice? How well do storable votes
behave when information about such distribution is imprecise? How do storable
votes compare to majority voting then?
3 The Experiment
3.1 The design
Several of Columbia￿ s schools hold elections in the spring, and the students￿or-
ganizations and the deans at the School of General Studies (GS) and Columbia
College (CC) agreed to collaborate with us. In each school, voters elected repre-
sentatives for multiple positions: GS students voted on a total of twenty di⁄erent
elections and CC students on twelve. We selected the subset of elections with
two candidates or two mutually exclusive party lists only ￿ three elections
in GS (Board President, Alumni Representative and International Represen-
tative), and four elections in CC (Executive Board, Senator-Two Year Term,
Senator-One Year Term, and Academic A⁄airs Representative)9.
All voting was electronic, and at the end of the ballot students were invited
to participate in our survey. In the GS case, interested students clicked on a
link and were redirected to a web page containing the survey. Students￿votes
and their responses to the survey were matched and saved under anonymous
identi￿ers and were later forwarded to us by the student bodies supervising
the elections. In the CC case, the survey was on paper, because of logistical
di¢ culties with the voting stations. At the end of their electronic ballot, CC
students interested in answering the survey were given a number to be copied
at the top of the paper questionnaire. The number allowed us to link their
responses to their actual votes, again forwarded to us anonymously after the
voting was concluded.
Understandably, the organizers of the elections were concerned with keeping
our interference minimal, and the survey had to be short. We asked two sets of
questions: ￿rst, how much the voter cared about the outcome of each of those
elections, on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 10 (a lot); second, in which of these
elections the voter would cast a single additional bonus vote in support of his or
her favorite candidate, had one been available. The paper questionnaire for CC
is reproduced in the Appendix; the electronic GS questionnaire was identical,
with one exception ￿ being electronic, and thus faster, we added a question
about expected election outcomes.
Prior to the elections, students in both schools were informed about the
9We excluded the elections for class presidents or representatives because they concern
di⁄erent subsets of the electorates. We also excluded two elections where one of the candidates
was accused of irregularities and later disquali￿ed.
6survey through a school-wide email message, and through posters and ￿ iers dis-
tributed widely throughout campus. Possible prizes from answering the survey
were advertised: respondents from each school would take part in a lottery with
iPods and $20 gift certi￿cates at Barnes & Noble awarded to the winners.10
3.2 The data.
Out of a total of 1161 GS students, 476 voted in the GS elections, and of these
297 answered our survey; in the College, 2057 voted out of a potential electorate
of 4073, and 644 answered the survey. After eliminating CC questionnaires that
were either unreadable or unmatchable to actual voters, we cleaned the data
according to the following criteria: (1) we assigned a score of 0 to any election
in which a respondent abstained, a plausible option logically, and the only one
available since we could not match the score to a voting choice; (2) we assigned a
score of 1 to any election in which a respondent voted but left the ranking blank,
and (3) we eliminated from the sample respondents who stated that they would
cast the bonus vote in an election in which they in fact abstained, implying
that the survey answers were patently untruthful or confused. Because the CC
questionnaires were on paper, they were missing automatic completeness checks
that the electronic program forced instead on the GS students. In particular,
nine CC respondents did not indicate where they would have cast the bonus
vote. But choosing not to use the bonus vote is a legitimate choice, and we left
these respondents in the sample. After cleaning the data, we were left with 276
responses in the GS sample and 502 in the CC sample, or a valid response rate
among voters of 58 percent in GS and 24 percent in CC.11
3.3 The distributions of the scores.
Figure 1 reports the distributions of the scores assigned by respondents to each
election, for both GS (Figure 1a), and CC (Figure 1b). Scores are labeled posi-
tive or negative, according to which of the two candidates the respondent voted
for; for ease of reading, in each election we assign positive scores to the candi-
date commanding a majority in our sample. Consider for example the election
10The prizes were 2 iPods and 8 gift certi￿cates for the CC lottery (with a potential elec-
torate of 4,073); and 1 iPod and 5 gift certi￿cates for the GS lottery (with a potential electorate
of 1,161 students).
11Participation in the survey was voluntary and we cannot expect our samples to be rep-
resentative of the population. For the electorate as a whole, we have data on the number
of votes cast for either candidate in each election, and the number of abstentions. Table A1
in the Appendix tests the hypothesis that in each school both the rest of the electorate and
our sample are random draws from a common population. When we look at abstention rates,
the hypothesis is rejected at the 5 percent con￿dence level for all GS elections and for two
of the four CC elections ￿ predictably individuals who answered our questionnaires have
signi￿cantly lower abstentions rates. When we look at support for the winning candidate
among voters, the hypothesis is rejected in the President election in the GS sample and in the
Academic A⁄airs election in the CC data ￿ both elections were much closer in our sample
than in the full electorate, a surprising ￿nding for which we have no explanation.
7for Board President in the GS sample, at the top of Figure 1a. The scores as-
signed by Susannah￿ s supporters are plotted on the positive axis; those of Liz￿ s
supporters on the negative axis, while the cell at zero, in black, reports absten-
tions. The histogram tells us that 23 of Liz￿ s supporters and 31 of Susannah￿ s
assigned to the election a score of 10; 11 of Liz￿ s supporters and 13 of Susan-
nah￿ s assigned it a score of 9, etc. The box next to the histogram summarizes
the main data concerning this election. In our sample of 276 students, 142 vot-
ers supported Susannah, 129 supported Liz, and 5 abstained; 208 stated that
they would have cast the bonus vote in this election, and, attributing the bonus
votes according to each respondent￿ s actual candidate choice, Susannah again
wins a majority of the bonus votes (110 against 98). Susannah did in fact win
the election among all voters, with 241 votes in favor, versus 188 for Liz and
47 abstentions. The box reports also the average score assigned to the election
by the supporters of each candidate: the average score is slightly higher among
Susannah￿ s supporters (6.7 versus 6.3 for Liz￿ s supporters).
In the GS sample, the election for President was overwhelmingly the most
salient: abstentions are less than one tenth of the second best attended election
(International), and average scores are about seventy percent higher than in the
other elections. Two of the three elections (President and Alumni A⁄airs) were
close elections, and in these elections not only is the extent of support simi-
lar between the two candidates, but the distributions of voters￿scores are also
approximately symmetrical across the two sides. The third election (Interna-
tional) was quite lopsided. If the elections had been held with bonus votes, none
of the outcomes would have changed: in the President and in the International
election, the majority winner commands a majority of the bonus votes; it does
not in Alumni A⁄airs, but the di⁄erence is small (2 votes), and cannot override
the di⁄erence in regular votes.
In the CC sample, there is again one election that voters in our sample con-
sidered most salient (Executive Board), with both low abstentions and higher
average scores, but the di⁄erence with respect to the others is less pronounced
than in GS. The Senate-Two Year election was a landslide, but the others, and
in particular Senate-One Year and Academic A⁄airs were close elections. The
Academic A⁄airs election, with scores distributed according to the histogram at
the bottom of Figure 1b, is particularly interesting. Here Alidad won a majority
of the votes (230 versus 195 for Ehizoje), but the average score is higher among
Ehizoje￿ s supporters (6.1 versus 4.9 for Alidad). The distribution is not sym-
metric, with the majority of Ehizoje￿ s supporters attributing high importance
to the outcome, while the scores given by Alidad￿ s supporters are concentrated
in the middle range. Storable votes are designed to address situations of this
type, and not surprisingly Ehizoje receives about 25 percent more bonus votes
than Alidad (38 to 30), although the di⁄erence of 8 votes would not have been
enough to counter the majority advantage. In the CC sample too bonus votes
would not have changed any of the outcomes.
The scores re￿ ect the importance attached by respondents to the di⁄erent
elections, and we interpret them as measures of intensity of preferences. More
precisely, and in line with the theoretical model, we read the scores as proxies
8for the di⁄erential utility that each respondent attaches to having the preferred
candidate win that speci￿c election, as opposed to the opponent. The impor-
tant information is the relative score assigned by each respondent to di⁄erent
contests: it is preferable to have one￿ s favorite candidate win an election rated
as a 4 than an election rated as a 2. To give a measurable meaning to intensity
of preferences, we must interpret the scores as not only ordinal but cardinal
values: we use the simplest linear mapping, so that winning an election rated as
a 4 is not only preferable but twice as valuable as winning an election rated as a
2. The distributions of the scores in Figure 1 are then the empirical counterpart
of the distributions of preferences discussed in the theory.
If the scores measure intensity of preferences, we can construct measures of
aggregate welfare in our samples. The most immediate utilitarian measure sim-
ply sums all scores over supporters of each candidate and calls e¢ cient in any
election the victory of the candidate whose supporters have higher aggregate
scores. For example, in the Board President election in GS, Susannah￿ s sup-
porters are both more numerous and have higher average score, guaranteeing a
higher aggregate score (954, compared to 810 for Liz￿ s supporters), leading to
the conclusion that e¢ ciency favored Susannah￿ s victory.
As welfare measure, the sum of the reported scores has the important ad-
vantage of being closest to the questionnaire. The di¢ culty is that in general,
evaluated over all elections, it will give di⁄erent weights to di⁄erent voters,
re￿ ecting di⁄erences in the total scores that each of them has assigned. An
alternative is to construct and sum normalized scores: scores obtained by con-
straining all individuals to the same total score. Speci￿cally, if the number of
elections is K and sR
ik is the reported score assigned by individual i to election
k, normalized score sik equals sR
ik=
PK
r=1 sR
ik, with the property that the sum
of normalized scores assigned by a single individual always equals 1 and has
mean 1=K. A normalized utilitarian measure of welfare is then the sum of the
normalized scores over supporters of each candidate.
The histograms describing the distributions of normalized scores are reported
in the Appendix. In Figure 2 we summarize the properties of our data, using
both reported and normalized scores. The ￿gure reports margins in favor of
the majority, in each election, in terms of the number of votes, aggregate, and
average scores.12 Figure 2a is based on reported scores, as was Figure 1, while
Figure 2b uses normalized scores.
The two sets of ￿gures are not identical, suggesting that the normalization
does play some role: because it accounts for each individual￿ s overall scoring
pattern, the normalization in general rescales di⁄erently scores from di⁄erent in-
dividuals, and thus changes both average and total scores. However, the ￿gures
make clear that the qualitative conclusions are robust: if e¢ ciency is measured
by higher aggregate scores, the e¢ cient outcome in each election is unchanged
12If M is the size of the majority, and m the size of the minority, the margin of victory
among voters is simply: (M￿m)=n. Using s to denote the reported score in Figure 2a and the
normalized score in Figure 2b, the aggregate score margin in favor of the majority is calculated
as:
￿P
i2M si ￿
P
i2m si
￿
=
Pn
i=1 si, and the average score margin is: (^ sM ￿ ^ sm)=(^ sM + ^ sm)
where ^ sM = (
P
i2M si)=M and ^ sm = (
P
i2m si)=m.
9whether we refer to reported or normalized scores ￿ the dark gray columns al-
ways have equal sign in Figures 2a and 2b. In the GS sample, e¢ ciency always
supports the majority choice. In the CC sample, e¢ ciency supports the ma-
jority side on three of the four elections, but the majority￿ s total score margin
is slightly negative, albeit with a margin so small as to be undetectable in the
￿gure, in the fourth (Academic A⁄airs) where the larger size of the majority is
countered by the stronger intensity of preferences of the minority. Again, the
observation holds for both sets of scores.
3.4 The bonus vote decision
In the GS sample, 89 percent of the voters cast their bonus vote in an election
to which they assigned their highest score, and 81 percent did so in the CC
sample. If voters knew little about all elections and were aware of their lack of
information, this would be both the simplest and the optimal strategy. Which
other criteria in￿ uenced their choice? Figures 3a for GS and 3b for CC show the
relevant data, election by election. Each diagram reports, for all respondents
who said they would cast the bonus vote on that speci￿c election, the reported
score assigned to that election, on the vertical axis, and to the highest ranked of
the other elections, on the horizontal axis. If the election selected for the bonus
vote is the highest score election, then the respondent is indicated by a point
above the 45 degree line; if not, by a point below the 45 degree line.13
The most salient election in each data set (President in GS and Executive
Board in CC) received the great majority of the bonus votes, and was also the
election most respondents ranked as most important to them. In all elections,
some bonus votes were cast by respondents who ranked a di⁄erent contest higher.
The number of such bonus votes is relatively small in both the GS President
election (8 percent) and the CC Executive Board election (12 percent), but less
so, in relative terms, in the other contests, reaching 50 percent in the Senate-
One Year election in CC. Over the full electorate ￿ and it is the full electorate
that a voter would consider when deciding where to cast the bonus vote ￿
Senate-One Year was the closest election in CC. If voters rationally weigh the
probability of being pivotal, then we would expect the pattern seen in the CC
sample. In the GS data set, on the other hand, the bonus vote choice does
not seem to correlate in any transparent manner with the realized margin of
victory: the closest election was Alumni A⁄airs, with a margin of 2 percent,
but the fraction of voters who cast the bonus vote in that election while ranking
a di⁄erent one higher is smaller than the fraction in the International election,
the most lopsided, with a margin of victory of 28 percent.
According to the theory, the bonus vote choice depends on the common
knowledge of the distributions of valuations in the electorate at large. But we
do not have any evidence that preferences were common knowledge, indeed we
13The only relevant information in the ￿gure is the ordinal ranking of the elections, and
reported scores show the di⁄erence across elections more clearly. Normalized scores yield a
rescaled but otherwise identical ￿gure.
10have some evidence to the contrary. As mentioned earlier, in the GS question-
naire, electronic and thus faster, we added a question about expected election
outcomes. In the election for President, more than 80 percent of the students
￿lling the questionnaire answered the question, but about half of them predicted
the wrong winner, and a quarter predicted that she would win by a large margin;
in the other two elections, more than half of those ￿lling the questionnaires chose
not to answer the question, in line with the large abstention rate, but among
those who did respond, a majority predicted the wrong winner in the Alumni
A⁄airs election, half of them by a large margin, and one third did so in the In-
ternational election.14 These answers may re￿ ect something other that rational
calculations of expected outcomes, but cannot be read as support for common
knowledge of the full distributions of valuations. The lack of information by the
voters could explain the anomalies noticed in Figure 3.
If preferences were not common knowledge, we have no basis for testing
rigorously the strategic behavior predicted by the theory described earlier. In
fact, we have two additional reasons to be cautious. First, we do not know
the distribution of valuations for the electorate as a whole: it is the choice
of the entire electorate that any single voter is trying to in￿ uence, but the
distributions of valuations we construct from the survey refer to a sample only
￿ the respondents of the survey. Second, when asking where the respondent
would cast the bonus vote, the questionnaire did not state explicitly that in the
thought experiment all other voters would also be casting their bonus vote. We
doubt that answers would have been di⁄erent otherwise, but we do not know
how the question was interpreted.
For all of these reasons, we limit ourselves to a descriptive exploration of the
bonus vote choices in our samples. We will use them later, when we estimate the
probable impact of the bonus vote on outcomes, but only as one of four plausible
behavioral rules that voters may follow. In fact, in addition to the actual survey
responses, it will be useful to have a concise description of the patterns we see
in the data. A simple statistical model provides such a description.
3.5 A simple statistical model
The model describes respondents￿bonus vote choices through a set of elementary
criteria, each of which speci￿es how to cast the bonus vote. Each respondent￿ s
answer, given his or her scores, can then be written in terms of the probability
14The exact numbers are the following. For the President election, 50 of the 276 voters in
our sample declined to answer the question; 107 predicted that Liz would win, and of these 58
predicted a margin of victory larger than 10 percent; 119 predicted that Susannah would win,
and of these 52 predicted a margin of victory larger than 10 percent (in fact, Susannah won
with a margin of 12 percent). For Alumni A⁄airs, 157 of the 276 voters in our sample declined
to answer the question; 72 predicted that Bob would win, and of these 36 predicted a margin
of victory larger than 10 percent; 47 predicted that Maria would win, and of these 17 predicted
a margin of victory larger than 10 percent (Maria won with a margin of 2 percent). Finally,
for International Representative, 146 of the 276 voters in our sample declined to answer the
question; 91 predicted that Makiko would win, and of these 36 predicted a margin of victory
larger than 10 percent; 39 predicted that Liron would win, and of these 14 predicted a margin
of victory larger than 10 percent (Makiko won with a margin of 28 percent).
11of following the di⁄erent criteria. We posit four mutually exclusive criteria: (1)
cast the bonus vote in the election with highest score; (2) cast the bonus vote
in the most salient election; (3) cast the bonus vote in the closest election; (4)
some other criterion we ignore, and such that the choice appears to us fully
random. We suppose that each criterion is followed with some probability,
which we call pmax for criterion 1, psal for criterion 2, pclose for criterion 3
and prand for criterion 4, and we describe a respondent￿ s choice through these
probabilities. For example, consider a GS voter whose highest score is on the
President election, and who indicates that he would cast the bonus vote on that
election. Under our model, this behavior occurs with probability pmax+psal+
(1=3)prand. If the voter assigns the highest score also to a second election, then
the probability of the observed behavior becomes (1=2)pmax+psal+(1=3)prand,
and correspondingly for the other cases. Assuming that respondents￿choices are
independent, the likelihood of observing the data set is simply the product of
the probabilities of all individual choices. The probabilities pmax, psal, pclose,
and prand can then be estimated immediately through maximum likelihood or
Bayesian methods.
We have estimated the probabilities on the two data sets separately, and in
both cases maximum likelihood and Bayesian estimation yield identical results,
summarized in Table 1, with standard errors are in parentheses.15
GS CC
pmax 0.55 (0.06) 0.52 (0.04)
psal 0.34 (0.06) 0.30 (0.04)
pclose 0.01 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01)
Table 1: Population frequencies of three behavioral criteria as estimated from
a simple statistical model of observed bonus vote choices (with standard errors
in parentheses).
In both data sets and with both estimation methods, psal, the probability
of casting the bonus vote on the most salient election, is relatively large and
signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. At the same time, pclose, the probability of
casting the bonus vote on the election with smallest margin of victory, is always
small and in the GS sample insigni￿cant. Both results are theoretically puzzling:
the intensity of one￿ s preferences should be fully captured by the score, and,
as mentioned, the use of the bonus vote should be higher in close elections.
However, the two most salient elections were also reasonably close elections, the
second closest in both data sets, and attracted much more debate and attention
prior to voting than any of the others. It is possible that voters chose them
15In conducting the Bayesian inference, we assigned uniform prior distributions to each of
pmax, psal and pclose and used the software Bugs (Spiegelhalter et al., 1994, 2002). The
Bayesian approach works well here because with moderate sample sizes, maximum likelihood
estimates can be at the boundary of parameter space (as discussed in general terms in chapter
4 of Gelman et al., 2004).
12disproportionately not because they were salient, but because in fact they knew
them to be close contests, and had little information about the other elections.
The statistical model we have posited is a synthetic description of the data,
and should not be read as providing a test of the theory. In particular, the prob-
abilities with which the di⁄erent criteria are followed are treated as exogenous
parameters constant across voters, as opposed to being the expression of each
voter￿ s strategies, dependent on the voter￿ s full set of scores, as they would in a
strategic model.
4 Estimating the Probable Impact of the Bonus
Vote
As shown in Figure 1 and stated earlier, in our samples no outcome would have
changed with the addition of the bonus vote, given how respondents stated they
would cast it. But this is not very informative: because the bonus vote links the
outcomes of the bundle of elections over which the voters can choose to use it,
we have only two independent data points, one for each school, too few to form
an estimate of the bonus vote￿ s probable impact. To obtain such an estimate,
ideally we would want to replicate the same elections many times, with many
di⁄erent electorates whose preferences are all drawn from the same underlying
distribution. We cannot rerun the elections, but we can approximate such iter-
ations by bootstrapping our data.16 The objective is to estimate the impact of
the bonus vote in a population for which our samples are representative.
The maintained assumption of the bootstrapping exercise is that preferences
are independent across individuals, although not necessarily across elections for
a single individual. We sample with replacement n individuals from our data
sets, where n = 276 for GS and n = 502 for CC: for each individual, we sample
the scores assigned to all elections and the choice of where to cast the bonus
vote. We then replicate this procedure 10,000 times, where each replication
generates a distribution of preferences over each of the three elections in GS
and four elections in CC, and a bonus vote choice for each voter. Finally, for
each replication, we calculate outcomes and measures of welfare if the elections
were held with simple majority voting, and with four alternative rules governing
the use of the bonus vote. Rule A is closest to the data: we use the bonus vote
choice actually made by the individuals sampled in the bootstrapping; rule
B applies the statistical model described above to each bootstrap sample of
preferences, and thus adapts behavior to the actual bootstrap sample; rule C
states that every individual casts the bonus vote in the election with highest
score (randomizing with equal probability if more than one election has the
highest score); rule D replicates rule C but excludes the two most lopsided
elections in each sample, International in GS and Senate-Two year in CC. Each
of the four rules has some argument in its support, but it is the consistency of
16The classical references are Efron, 1979, and Efron and Tibshirani, 1993. For a recent
treatment, see Davidson and MacKinnon, 2006.
13the results across rules that gives us con￿dence in their robustness.
The bonus vote can give weight to the intensity of preferences, and thus,
given the distributions of preferences in our data, the hypothesis is that with
high probability storable votes should be equivalent to majority voting in the
GS elections, but have more impact and better welfare properties in the CC
elections. In what follows we describe the analysis based on normalized scores
which seem theoretically somewhat superior. We have veri￿ed that the results
are not sensitive to using either reported or normalized scores, as is to be ex-
pected given Figure 2.
4.1 The frequency of minority victories
The ￿rst question is the frequency with which, using the bonus vote, at least one
of the elections in each set is won by the minority candidate. As shown in Figure
4, in the GS bootstrap samples the frequency is stable across the di⁄erent rules
at around 15 percent. In the CC samples, the frequency increases monotonically
as we move from rule A to rule D: from 11 to 15 to 23 to 29 percent.
The aggregate number, appropriate because of the linkage across elections
imposed by the bonus vote, is the result of di⁄erent impacts on the speci￿c
elections. Tables 2a for GS and 2b for CC report the frequency with which any
individual election is won by the minority, for each bonus vote rule. The last
column reports the aggregate frequency depicted in the ￿gure. (In all cases,
we assigned a weight of 1/2 to any sample where either simple majority or the
bonus vote resulted in a tie).
Table 2a: GS
President Alumni International Aggregate
Rule A 5% 11% 0 16%
Rule B 6% 9% 0 14%
Rule C 8% 9% 0 16%
Rule D 7% 8% 0 15%
Table 2b: CC
Exec Board Senate-Two Senate-One Academic Aggregate
Rule A 0 0 2% 9% 11%
Rule B 0 0 1% 14% 15%
Rule C 0 0 1% 23% 23%
Rule D 0 0 1% 28% 29%
Table 2: Frequency of minority victories in 10,000 bootstrap samples, based on
four di⁄erent assignment rules for each of the elections in our study.
Predictably, the numbers re￿ ect the distributions of preferences over each
election. The most lopsided elections (International Representative in GS, and
Executive Board and Senate-Two Year in CC) are never won by the minority
14candidate. The election most susceptible to the impact of the bonus vote is
Academic A⁄airs in CC; moving from rule A to rule D the number of bonus
votes cast on Academic A⁄airs progressively increases; so does the frequency
with which the minority candidate wins, and so does the aggregate frequency.17
In the GS samples, the impact of the bonus vote re￿ ects mostly how close
the di⁄erent contests are. In the CC samples, again the bonus vote a⁄ects
exclusively the two closest elections, but the higher intensity of the minority
supporters in Academic A⁄airs plays a clear additional role in tilting the results
in the minority￿ s favor when the bonus vote is available.
We used 10,000 bootstrap samples to guarantee that the experimental error
(the binomial standard error of the observed frequencies due to the ￿nite size
of the sample) is negligible. As a test, we recalculated the frequencies in ta-
bles 2a and 2b with 20,000 independent bootstrap samples, con￿rming that all
frequencies changed by less than half of one percent.
Our ￿rst conclusion then is that in both sets of data and for all rules, al-
though particularly in CC for rules C and D, the bonus vote allows the minority
to win with substantial probability.
4.2 The impact of minority victories on aggregate welfare
How costly are minority victories in terms of aggregate welfare? Perhaps sur-
prisingly, our second result is that minority victories not only are not costly,
but in fact typically come with aggregate welfare gains.
In each election, realized welfare is de￿ned as the sum of all (normalized)
scores of all voters who supported the winner. With the bonus vote, the relevant
unit is again the full set of elections in each school, for each bootstrap sample.
More precisely, if Mk is the set of voters whose favorite candidate commands
a majority of regular votes in election k, then welfare with majority voting,
WM is de￿ned as WM =
P
k
P
i2Mk sik where sik is the score assigned to
election k by voter i. Similarly, welfare with storable votes WSV is de￿ned as
WSV =
P
k
P
i2Mk sik where Mk is the set of voters whose favorite candidate
commands a majority of all votes, including bonus votes, in elections k. We
select all bootstrap samples where the minority wins at least one election: in
each set of elections there exists at least one k for which Mk 6= Mk.18 Among
those samples only, the upper panel of Figure 5 shows the frequency with which
WSV > WM, and the lower panel shows the mean percentage welfare change
(mean (WSV ￿ WM)=WM).
For all four rules in the CC data and for three of the four in the GS data the
mean e⁄ect on welfare is positive. In the CC data, the result is strong: among
17In CC, rule B assigns some bonus votes to the closest election. In estimating the statistical
model, we identi￿ed as closest the election with the lowest margin of victory in the full elec-
torate. In the bootstrap exercise, we must limit ourselves to the sample. Taking into account
the bonus votes, Senate-1 is the closest election in 26 percent of the bootstrap samples, and
Academic A⁄airs in 72 percent. The remaining 2 percent of bootstrap samples are ambiguous
￿ either election can be closest, depending on how the bonus votes are cast. The ambiguity
does not a⁄ect the frequency reported in Figure 4.
18In the case of ties, we assign a probability of 50 percent to the victory of either side.
15all bootstrap samples where the minority wins at least one election, an increase
in aggregate welfare occurs from a minimum of 86 percent of the time (rule A)
to a maximum of 96 percent (rule C). The minority must be winning when its
preferences are more intense than the majority preferences. In the GS data,
the mean welfare change is always smaller than in CC, and in one case, when
it is smallest, the sign is negative (rule A); with rules B, C and D the expected
impact is positive, but the frequency with which aggregate welfare rises reaches
a maximum at 72 percent (rule D).
In addition to generating the summary results reproduced in Figure 5, the
bootstrap exercise provides us with the full distribution of the impact of the
bonus vote on aggregate welfare across all bootstrap samples. Figures 6a for GS
and 6b for CC present the histograms of the percentage di⁄erence in aggregate
welfare between each of the four bonus vote rules and majority voting, in all
samples where, using the bonus vote, the minority wins at least one election
in each set. The histograms show clearly the concentration of the probability
mass around the positive mean welfare change in the CC samples, while the
distribution is more dispersed in the case of GS. The higher variability of the GS
results is consistent with approximately symmetric preferences across the two
sides in elections a⁄ected by the bonus vote. Summary measures of dispersion
￿ standard errors and bootstrap con￿dence intervals ￿ are obtained easily; we
omit them here, preferring to present the full distributions. Because our focus is
on samples where the minority wins at least one election, the number of samples
analyzed here is between 1,400 and 1,600 for GS and between 1,000 and 3,000
in CC, depending on the bonus vote rule (see Table 2). We have compared the
results reported here to those obtained from a di⁄erent set of 10,000 bootstrap
samples, con￿rming that the experimental error remains negligible.
4.3 Inequality
Minorities should win occasionally not only because aggregate e¢ ciency is higher
when intensity of preferences is recognized, but also because preferences can be
correlated across elections, and individuals who ￿nd themselves repeatedly on
the minority side will feel unrepresented by the political system. If it comes at no
cost to aggregate welfare, a more equal distribution of decision-making in￿ uence
seems desirable in itself. Our data allow us to construct the full distribution of
ex post utility across voters in each of the bootstrap samples, where individual
utility is de￿ned as the sum of the voter￿ s scores over all elections won by the
voter￿ s preferred candidate. Formally, recalling that Mk is the set of voters
whose favorite candidate commands a majority of all votes, including bonus
votes, in elections k, ex post utility of voter i; Ui, is de￿ned as Ui =
P
kji2Mk sik.
The distribution across voters thus captures the di⁄erent frequencies with which
each voter￿ s preferred candidate wins, weighted by the relative importance the
voter assigns to each election. If instead of summing over all elections for which
i belongs to Mk, we sum over all elections for which i belongs to Mk ￿ the
set of voters whose favorite candidate commands a majority of regular votes in
election k ￿ we obtain for comparison ex post utility with majority voting. We
16can then calculate the impact of the bonus vote on voters￿ex post inequality.
Average realized utility distributions are shown in Figure 7. The bins on the
horizontal axis are ordered in increasing levels of utilities, each bin corresponding
to a 5 percent range, from lowest (0) to highest (1). The height of each bin is
the fraction of voters with utility falling into the bin, averaged over all samples
where, with the bonus vote, the minority wins at least one election. The black
line corresponds to the bonus vote (rule A), and the gray line to simple majority.
Here rule A is fully representative of the results obtained with the other bonus
vote rules. The higher polarization of the GS distributions re￿ ects the smaller
number of contests (3, as opposed to 4 in CC) and the overwhelming priority
assigned to a single election (President). The impact of the bonus vote on
the distribution is hardly detectable in the GS samples but is clear in the CC
sample, where the frequency of realizations at the two ends of the distribution
is reduced in favor of larger mass in the center.
Figure 8 reports the impact of the bonus vote on voters￿inequality as mea-
sured by the Gini coe¢ cient. In the CC data, inequality declines unambiguously:
over all bootstrap samples where the bonus vote allows the minority to win at
least one election, inequality declines from a minimum of 90 percent of the sam-
ples (rule A) to a maximum of 98 percent (rule D). Across all bonus vote rules,
the mean percentage decrease in the Gini coe¢ cient is 12￿ 13 percent. In the GS
data, on the other hand, the bonus vote￿ s e⁄ect on inequality is of inconsistent
sign and small magnitude. The Gini coe¢ cient declines barely more than 50
percent of the times with rules B, C and D, and barely less with rule A. The
e⁄ects are quantitatively small: the mean percentage change in the coe¢ cient
is an increase of 2 percent.
The di⁄erent results re￿ ect the di⁄erent roles of the bonus vote in the two
data sets. In the GS data, the elections a⁄ected by the bonus vote (President
and Alumni A⁄airs) are particularly close, with little di⁄erence in volume and
intensity of support between the two candidates. The side bene￿ting from the
bonus vote is not consistent across bootstrap samples, and thus the average
impact of the bonus vote on equality of representation is small and similarly
non consistent. In the CC data, on the other hand, the main role of the bonus
vote is to overthrow the majority victory in the Academic A⁄airs election, on
the strength of the more intense minority preferences. The distribution of pref-
erences is su¢ ciently asymmetric to ensure that in the bootstrap samples the
bonus vote consistently helps the same candidate. And because the minority in
the Academic A⁄airs election is also disproportionately on the minority side in
the other elections, the ￿nal result is a positive, sizable improvement in equal-
ity.19
19The precise numbers re￿ected in Figure 8 are reported in the Appendix, together with 95
percent con￿dence intervals. An alternative measure of inequality ￿ the ratio of the average
utility of individuals at the bottom 20 percent of the utility distribution to average utility ￿
yields identical conclusions, and is also reported in the Appendix.
175 Conclusions
Storable votes are a simple mechanism with the potential to improve fairness
without costs, in fact with some gains, to e¢ ciency. In our data, they perform
well: when the margins of victory are small, they allow the minority to win
occasionally, with no substantive e⁄ects on welfare and inequality if the two
sides have preferences of similar intensity, but with improvements in both if
minority preferences are particularly intense. Storable votes should be tested in
higher stake contests, particularly in referendums, for which they are expressly
designed. Using a new voting system in real elections is, appropriately, di¢ -
cult to do, and assembling an experimental data set rich enough to evaluate the
system￿ s performance statistically is probably impossible. Survey methods, cou-
pled with bootstrap resampling, are a more practical route. One of the goals of
this work is to suggest that the bootstrap methodology is ready to be exploited,
easily and cheaply.
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Susannah 241; Liz 188; Abs 47 
Bob >0 
Votes: Bob 106; Maria 97; Abs 73 
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Makiko >0 
Votes: Makiko 136; Liron 73; Abs 67 
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Makiko 203; Liron 113; Abs 160 
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 Figure 1: Histograms of recorded scores.   
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Figure 2a: Recorded scores 
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Figure 2b: Normalized scores 
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Figure 2. Margins in favor of the majority, per election. The first series (dotted) is the margin of victory 
among voters in our sample, ignoring the bonus vote. The second series (dark grey) is the aggregate score 
margin in favor of the majority. The third series (light grey) is the average intensity margin in favor of the 
majority. 
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Figure 3: Relative raw score of the election receiving the bonus vote.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                 
         
                                                       
            
                                           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Percentage frequency with which at least one election in each set is won by the minority, out of 
10,000 bootstrap samples, when voters cast their bonus vote according to each of four different rules. 
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Figure 5. Percentage frequency of aggregate welfare increases and mean percentage welfare change, 
relative to majority voting, when the minority wins at least one election. 
     
 
 
  
 
 
        
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Histograms of percentage welfare differences between the bonus vote scheme and majority 
voting in all samples where, with the bonus vote, the minority wins at least one election. The vertical axis 
is the percentage of such samples falling into each bin. 
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Figure 7: Realized utility distribution, simple majority (grey) and bonus vote, rule A, averaged over all 
samples in which the minority wins at least one election.  
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Figure 8. Percentage frequency of more equalitarian distributions of realized utility, and mean percentage 
decline in the Gini coefficient, relative to majority voting. Appendix
TABLE A1
Table A1a: GS
Abstentions Share of votes for winner
President
Alumni A⁄airs
Int￿ l Repr.
non-sample sample di⁄.
0.21 0.02 0.19*
0.54 0.26 0.28*
0.46 0.23 0.24*
non-sample sample di⁄.
0.63 0.53 0.10*
0.59 0.48 0.11
0.63 0.65 -0.02
Table A1b: CC
Abstentions Share of votes for winner
Exec Board
Senate-1
Senate-2
Academic A⁄s.
non-sample sample di⁄.
0.08 0.02 0.06*
0.15 0.12 0.03
0.13 0.08 0.05*
0.18 0.15 0.03
non-sample sample di⁄
0.57 0.60 -0.03
0.69 0.73 -0.04
0.56 0.55 0.01
0.65 0.54 0.11*
Table A1: Comparison of abstention rates and margins of victory in and
outside the samples. Both in the electorate as a whole and in our samples: (i)
abstention rates are calculated for each election for students who voted at least
once, and thus do not re￿ ect the fraction of students who did not take part in
voting at all; (ii) the share of votes for the winner is calculated among voters in
each election, and thus ignores abstentions.
1TABLE A2
MEASURES OF INEQUALITY WHEN OUTCOMES DIFFER
Table A2a: General Study
Gini Coe¢ cient
Maj Bv A Bv B Bv C Bv D
Mean 0.347 0.353 0.353 0.353 0.354
95% CI (0.20, 0.40) (0.21, 0.40) (0.21, 0.40) (0.22, 0.40) (0.22, 0.39)
Prob bv lower (%) 47.9 52.8 58.2 58
Ratio of average utility of bottom 20% to sample average
Maj Bv A Bv B Bv C Bv D
Mean (%) 9.08 7.89 7.44 7.14 6.78
95% CI (0, 47.1) (0, 45.0) (0, 44.9) (0, 43.7) (0, 43.1)
Prob bv higher (%) 52.5 51.2 53.5 49.4
Table A2b: Columbia College
Gini Coe¢ cient
Maj Bv A Bv B Bv C Bv D
Mean 0.280 0.246 0.243 0.243 0.243
95% CI (0.24, 0.30) (0.22, 0.29) (0.22, 0.28) (0.22, 0.27) (0.22, 0.27)
Prob bv lower (%) 90.5 95.3 97.1 97.7
Ratio of average utility of bottom 20% to sample average
Maj Bv A Bv B Bv C Bv D
Mean (%) 27.27 33.88 34.42 34.42 34.38
95% CI (22.5, 37.7) (24.9, 41.8) (25.9, 41.5) (27.2, 41.0) (27.4, 41.2)
Prob bv higher (%) 88.6 94.0 96.6 97.0
Table A2: Measures on inequality when the minority wins at least one elec-
tion. Because we are focussing on bootstrap samples where majority voting and
the bonus vote lead to di⁄erent outomes, to each bonus vote rule corresponds
a slightly di⁄erent data set. The values reported in the table for majority rule
correspond to bootstrap samples where majority and Rule A lead to di⁄erent
outcomes (the values in the other cases are almost identical).
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Columbia University Economics Department       Voting Experiment 
Thank you for choosing to participate in this experiment.  By entering your number below, and attaching 
your post-it to the questionnaire you acknowledge that you have read, and understand the consent form 
(attached to the ballot box). Please enter your number here: 
A lottery will be conducted among all participants who have followed the instructions of the experiment and 
written the number above legibly.  The winner will receive an iPod. 
This experiment asks you how much you care about the outcome of some of the elections. 
Each election can be scored on a scale of 1-10, with 10 meaning "care very much" and 1 meaning "care not 
at all".  In order to indicate a box, please cross out the relevant number with an X like this: 
 
 
E - B o a r d           
 
     
 
Senate (1 year) 
 
 
 
Senate  (2  year)           
 
 
 
Academic Affairs                    
 
 
 
Suppose now that, in addition to the regular votes you cast earlier, you had 1 additional vote to cast in favor 
of your candidate in one of the elections.  You can choose any of these four elections as you see fit.  Which 
one would you choose? (NOTE: This is for experimental purposes only.  Your answer will not change the 
outcome of the actual elections in any way).  
Please check the box under the election you choose.  Please check only one box. 
E-Board    Senate (1 year)  Senate (2 year)    Academic Affairs   
 Evolution     David  Ali   Tiffany Davis      Ehizoje Azeke 
Open Columbia  Yihe (Eric) Wang  Gerry Rodriguez    Alidad Damooei 
  
                
 
 
 
Thank you for participating.  And good luck with the lottery! 
 
 
Figure A1: The written questionnaire submitted to CC students. 
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Figure A2a: GS 
 
 
       
 
 
 
  
 Figure A2b: CC 
                                      
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A2:  Histograms of normalized scores.  
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